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Introduction 
In Bo Burnham’s film Eighth Grade (2018) screens become the lifeworld[1] of 
the film’s protagonist, Kayla (portrayed by Elsie Fisher). Kayla is a thirteen-
year-old on the cusp of adolescence who is navigating the tribulations of the 
final stages of middle school. Her life is going through several transitions, and 
the plethora of connected screens she encounters becomes a space where 
Kayla can both hide from the world and engage with it. As such, the film il-
lustrates that – as cinema theorist Vivian Sobchack suggests – contemporary 
definitions of the screen need to be reformulated. Sobchack writes that the 
increased multiplication and convergence of the screen in society requires 
screen researchers to no longer consider screens as an ‘“array” of discrete ar-
tefacts’ but instead ‘a structural and functional collectivity’. [2] Sobchack calls 
this collectivity the screen-sphere and contends that the screen no longer exists 
as an occasional aspect of our lifeworld, but rather ‘screens now are our life-
world’. [3] 
Although Kayla engages in a variety of screenic[4] behaviours, it is the 
selfie that emerges as a central and repeated one. The selfie – which will be 
discussed and explored in this article – has received considerable attention 
from researchers following its 2013 pronouncement as the Oxford Diction-
ary’s word of the year.[5] The scope of the research surrounding the selfie 
has been interdisciplinary and multifaceted, looking at various aspects of the 
NECSUS – EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MEDIA STUDIES 
selfie, with a variety of questions being raised regarding the selfie’s particular 
ontology. Emerging voices have presented arguments which expand existing 
definitions of the selfie beyond simply that of an image or snapshot, and into 
more complex processes,[6] assemblages,[7] and activities.[8] Theresa M. 
Senft and Nancy K. Baym argue that the selfie is both ‘a photographic object … 
[and also] a practice – a gesture’.[9] This was expanded further by photog-
raphy theorist Paul Frosh who defined the selfie as a ‘gestural image’: a ‘new 
phatic agent in the energy flows between bodily movements, sociable inter-
actions, and media technologies that have become fundamental to our eve-
ryday, routine experience of digital activities’.[10] What this literature reveals, 
ultimately, is that when examining selfies (such as Kayla’s) it is not only the 
image which should be considered, but the various processes that occur lead-
ing up to the moment when the image is arrested. I am in full agreement with 
Senft and Baym, and Frosh, in their use of the term ‘gesture’, however, in 
both their respective cases, the concept of gesture is something of a ‘given’ 
and not explored beyond common-use definitions of the term. This arguably 
does a disservice to the potential richness of defining the selfie as gestural, as 
the critical potential of the term is never fully elaborated upon. In both cases, 
their selfie-gestures are simply shared gestures of photography (the taking 
and sharing of an image). However, it is perhaps more appropriate to con-
sider the selfie not as a ‘photographic’ gesture, but an embodying, screenic one. 
Therefore, if we are to expand existing definitions of the selfie through ges-
ture’s true critical potential, we need to step back from the ‘photographic’ 
moment of the selfie assemblage and instead look at various other processes 
implicit in it. Let us consider, briefly, two of the processes Kayla engages in. 
First, consider the variety of screenic movements Kayla performs. Her 
screen is touched, grasped, held, and carried. With the smartphone’s rise into 
a position of ubiquity, vivid debates have emerged surrounding how individ-
uals engage with screens that require touching. Notably, Wanda Strauven 
writes there is a ‘fundamental link between seeing and touching’[11] in con-
temporary screen use, and suggests that we should ‘rethink the image in the 
era of the [touched] post-image’.[12] This combination of touching and see-
ing has, as Nanna Verhoef argues, impelled the screen into proximity of the 
body insofar as ‘what distinguishes the touchscreen from other screen de-
vices … is the fact that spatial proximity of the screen not only can involve the 
user’s body, [but] the screen must be touched’.[13] Such movements are made 
complex because of how mobile screens (such as those of the smartphone) fit 
into the hand (a term developed by Heidi Rae Cooley, examined further 
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down).[14] Touching, holding, and moving in this series of movements en-
gages the complex prehensile postures; ‘virtual fingers’[15] and these screenic 
touches are not simply a method of navigation, but rather a form of what can 
be understood as ‘tactile vision’: a method of seeing and knowing through the 
active, prehensile postures of the hand.[16] 
Second, consider Kayla’s relationship with (what I am calling) the digital 
mirror when taking selfies. This mirror is not a reflecting glass mirror, but an 
apparatus comprised of a screen and a front-facing camera. We see evidence 
of the ‘double-axis’ of posing before a mirror and posing before a camera 
that has emerged within selfie research.[17] However, what makes this mirror 
so unique is that it does not allow Kayla to make direct eye-contact with her 
mirror-self, and the adjacency of the camera to the screen results in an un-
canny moment where the space becomes truly heterotopic (an-other-space). 
This heterotopia’s ability to allow an individual to simultaneously occupy the 
virtual space behind its surface and the physical space before its surface re-
sults in a complex phenomenological moment with Kayla being here (as a 
perceiving body) and there (as a body being looked upon). However, the 
break in eye-contact here resists any reconciliation between the Leib (lived 
body) and the Körper (material body)[18] that some have argued an analogue 
glass mirror allows for (as will be further explored in this text). In this digital 
mirror Kayla is not looking at her reflection; instead she is looking at herself 
looking at herself, and the learned ‘habitual familiarity’[19] of her own reflec-
tion becomes problematised. 
While these two processes may appear incidental to the capturing of the 
image, I posit that these processes extend and complicate existing definitions 
of the selfie and suggest that the selfie is a complex gesture that produces a 
novel form of embodiment within the screen-sphere. Positing such brings 
into question Sobchack’s claims that individuals cannot physically dwell 
within the screen-sphere, and further raises some important questions about 
an individual’s phenomenological relationship with the screen today. Kayla’s 
selfies reveal some fascinating insights into how the body, the device, and 
space have become arranged within the complex topology of screens which 
have relentlessly occupied ‘the interior and exterior spaces of our life-
world’,[20] and how gesture becomes a method of engaging with them. Ulti-
mately, therefore, if contemporary definitions of the screen require refor-
mulation then our embodied, gestural relationship with screens requires re-
formulation as well. This article presents the selfie as a starting point for such 
enquires. 
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Practically, this paper will begin by describing Sobchack’s screen-sphere 
as a screenic topology. It will then describe how movements emerge in an 
effect of this topology, and, following this, explore the mirror and its rela-
tionship to the gestural, moving body with regard to the selfie, ultimately es-
tablishing the selfie as gestural. The definition of gesture I will be using here 
is primarily Flusserian, with gesture best described as a production of mean-
ing that is contained in some practised performance. In Flusser’s words, a 
‘symbolic movement’[21] of the body that at once both expresses and articu-
lates meaning. Flusser’s symbolic movement is a fruitful launching point for 
a wider interdisciplinary reading of the term that, as Ana Hedburg Olenina 
and Irina Schulzki note, attends to the twofold challenge of navigating the 
‘encumbrance of utterances leading to gesticulation on the one hand [, the 
symbolic,], and the methodological problem of accounting for- and ade-
quately referencing all nuances of the bodily act [, the movement,] on the 
other’.[22] Last, it warrants mentioning that the reading of the body provided 
here is explicitly Merleau-Pontian in as much as the body is not to be under-
stood as a ‘mechanical organism’ but rather a subjectively centred, perceiving 
incarnate consciousness. 
The screen-sphere as a screenic topology 
An opening sequence in Burnham’s Eighth Grade effectively illustrates the 
screen-sphere and the complex way it creates space(s). First, let us count the 
screens present during the sequence: Kayla’s alarm goes off on her phone (a 
screen) and it becomes the first thing she sees in the morning as it ‘phatically 
call[s her] … into existence’.[23] From here she moves to the bathroom 
wherein she begins the process of applying make-up in a mirror (a screen). 
Alongside this mirror is her laptop (a screen) upon which a make-up tutorial 
video is playing. Following this, she returns to her bedroom grasping her 
phone and her laptop (both screens) in either hand. As she lies in bed, she 
extends her phone before her face and uses it as a mirror before proceeding 
to take a series of selfies. 
Each of these screens describe space. The light of the screen when she 
wakes up illuminates her face and becomes one of a series of similar shots in 
the film where a cone of light connects a spectator to a screen (much in the 
same way a cone of light describes space in Anthony McCall’s Line Describing 
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a Cone).[24] The bathroom mirror creates what Michel Foucault calls a heter-
otopia (literally an ‘other-place’) insofar as ‘it makes this place that [an indi-
vidual occupies] at the moment when [they] look at [themselves] in the glass 
at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and 
absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this 
virtual point which is over there’.[25] Further, the laptop screen is divided 
into various windows as the interface allows for Kayla’s computer desktop to 
be overlapped by her own YouTube profile which is overlapped by the make-
up tutorial video. In this instance, the single laptop screen functions as a mise 
en abyme of screenic windows which ‘overlap and obscure, and are resizable 
and movable’.[26] This ostensibly results in a ‘single’ physical screen function-
ing as multiple virtual screens, further edifying Sobchack’s claim that screens 
today are no longer discrete artefacts but a single connectivity. Finally, when 
Kayla returns to the bedroom, the film shows her carrying and tossing her 
mobile devices and consequently rearranging existing nodes of space. As she 
lies on the bed and activates her digital mirror, the same heterotopic space of 
the bathroom mirror appears to emerge once again within her mobile phone. 
Fig. 1: Four examples from the film demonstrating how a cone of light creates spaces 
between an individual and their device. 
To further complicate matters, several of these screens can be reoriented 
on vertical or horizontal axes resulting in a further ‘reconfiguration of the 
patterns of space involved’.[27] The laptop is mobile, it can be rotated, and 
the hinged screen can be tilted near horizontally. Also, the orientation of the 
mobile phone (when grasped in the hand) is determined only by the length 
of the arm and any coalescence of sophisticated radial or lunar rotations of 
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the wrist, extensions or flexions of the elbow, and abductions or adductions 
of the shoulder joint. As Miriam de Rosa and Wanda Strauven note this reor-
ientation of the screen ‘implies a more profound change … in our ways of 
conceptualising the screenic device’.[28] I will turn to the implications of this 
reorientation through grasping devices further down, but in the meanwhile 
it is important to note the complicated spatial possibilities. 
This creates complex arrangements of screens and spaces, and it is this 
complicated arrangement – so effectively demonstrated in Eighth Grade – 
that Sobchack calls the screen-sphere. Her greater intellectual project is cen-
tred around the ‘bodily and material foundations’[29] of viewing a film or 
moving image and throughout her titles The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenol-
ogy of Film Experience (1992) and Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Im-
age Culture (2004), Sobchack thoroughly challenges basic assumptions be-
tween the spectator and the screen and concludes that the position of the 
spectator within the cinematic apparatus is a sensuous one. Sobchack’s con-
ceptualisation of the screen-sphere is an elaboration of her theory of embod-
ied, phenomenological screen spectatorship in response to the dramatic 
change the screen has undergone in society today. The screen is no longer 
arrested by the apparatus of the cinema or the home, but rather it has become 
‘ubiquitous, interconnected, and mobile’[30] with ‘increasingly dynamic 
connectivity’.[31] This increasingly dynamic connectivity has as much to do 
with wireless and cabled internet connections as it has to do with space. 
Screens today are not simply connected through the networked infrastruc-
ture of the internet, but connected in the manner by which they describe and 
define a complicated arrangement of space(s). Interestingly, in Sobchack’s 
earlier attempt at describing the screen-sphere (in an article titled ‘Compre-
hending Screens: A Meditation in Medias Res’ [2014]) the question of how 
space operates in relation to the screen is scarcely touched upon. Only in a 
later version of the paper (expanded upon and published in Screens from Ma-
teriality to Spectatorship – A Historical and Theoretical Reassessment [2016], and 
retitled ‘From Screen-Scape to Screen-Sphere: A Meditation in Medias Res’) 
is the issue of space dealt with directly. As she writes: 
The screens that constitute the screen-sphere’s boundary components locate us both 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ – although this distinction becomes no longer viable. Indeed, 
because they open and extrude an n-dimensional space, the screens at the boundary 
of the screen-sphere form the equivalent of a Möbius strip, in which their spatial 
‘looping’ of 3-D and n-D creates a continuous and one-sided surface of display. The 
screens bounding the screen-sphere no longer face ‘inward’ toward us or ‘outward’ 
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away from us, but face us wherever we are, their chiasmatic function both connect-
ing and separating the 3-D ‘here’ wherever we physically are and the n-D ‘there’ 
where we virtually are, but physically are not.[32] 
This description of the spaces of the screen-sphere is both complicated 
and complex and certainly illustrates how screens and space become inter-
volved today (as demonstrated in the above sequence from Eighth Grade). 
However, I suggest that a more effective method for describing this virtual 
sphere is as a screenic topology. 
I am using Brian Massumi’s conceptualisation of topology here – that is, 
as a way of approaching the virtual. As he writes, a ‘topological figure is de-
fined as the continuous transformation of one geometrical figure into an-
other’.[33] It is the way in which constituent parts are interrelated and ar-
ranged. So, in the case of Kayla’s space, the arrangement of screens in the 
bathroom become rearranged in the bedroom and through the screens’ con-
nectivity all ‘the geometrical figures [she] can create in this way are versions 
of the same topological figure: [insofar as] topological unity is, in and of itself, 
multiple’.[34] 
There are a distinct set of advantages when considering the screen-sphere 
as a screenic topology. First, a topology’s predilection for ‘doublings and fold-
ings, punctualities rejoining encompassments, prospection buckling into ret-
rospection, [and] expanding contractions and contracting expanses’ will al-
low us to account for what Sobchack describes as the ‘non-Euclidian’[35] na-
ture of the sphere. Again, following Massumi, the word ‘non-Euclidian’ is a 
‘coinvent short-hand that accounts for space of this kind: that cannot be sep-
arated from its duration due to a transitional excess of movement … a good-
enough nontechnical term for dynamic or durational “spaces” that do not fit 
into the classical Euclidean (actually Cartesian) intuition of space as a triple-
axis’.[36] Thus, by considering the screen-sphere as a topology we can belie 
a definition that simply reduces the complexity of the screen-sphere to noth-
ing more than an arrangement of connected screens. As a topology, the 
screen-sphere includes the space(s) created in conjunction with the collection 
of screens that describe it. In other words, the screen-sphere is not simply a 
collection of multiple, connected screens, but rather the result of how spaces 
have changed following the recent irruption of screens. More importantly, 
however, as a topology we can do away with Sobchack’s ‘boundary compo-
nents’ that supposedly limit and separate the screen-sphere. While Sob-
chack’s metaphor of the Möbius Strip accounts for the relationship between 
3-D and n-D spaces that are simultaneously interior and exterior, by moving 
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into the topological the screen-sphere is not a specific shape, but rather ‘con-
tinuous and multiple’ as it arranges and rearranges itself continually.[37] 
However, by defining this topology as screenic, the material, historical, and 
physical components of this sphere are not to be ignored. It is necessary to 
be aware that the screen as an information surface, or a surface that hides or 
reveals, is loaded with a complicated cultural, etymological, and technical 
history. As Erikki Huhtamo’s pioneering work in the field of screenology re-
minds us, media studies ‘should not be only on screens as designed artefacts, 
but also on their uses, their intermedial relations with other cultural forms 
and on the discourses that have enveloped them in different times and 
places’.[38] By maintaining such considerations in relation to the space(s) cre-
ated allows for one to account for how different surfaces manage space in 
relation to one another. For example, a television screen delineates space dif-
ferently from a mirror, which delineates space differently from a 
smartphone, which in turn delineates space differently from a television. Ac-
knowledging these differences allows for a more effective navigation when 
surfaces inevitably collapse, overlap, and collide in the new arrangements (as 
is the case with the smartphone and the mirror in relation to the selfie, to be 
discussed). 
In summary, the screen-sphere is a complex spatial topology that exhibits 
screenic qualities: a screenic topology. Kayla’s morning routine, from waking 
up to taking the day’s first selfie, all exist in effect of this topology. However, 
what is perhaps most important to note within Kayla’s (screenic) behaviours 
are that all of them display some level of gesturality insofar as all her behav-
iours are a combination of both ‘performative acts and the situatedness of the 
human body’.[39] For example, holding the phone, shutting off the alarm, 
applying make-up, posing before the mirror and – finally – taking selfies. 
The resultant question here, for my purposes then, is how does the gesture 
of the selfie specifically manifest in effect of a screenic topology? Considering 
that the screens of this topology are not discrete, separate artefacts, it is there-
fore possible to assume that there are no discrete, separate gestures. To ex-
pand and establish this, two aspects of the selfie are to be accounted for: its 
movement in relation to the corporeal, and the mirror’s place within the 
selfie’s assemblage. 
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The movements of the body and the screenic topology 
Consider, for a moment, Kayla’s gestures in the previously mentioned morn-
ing routine sequence. As Kayla’s alarm goes off, she reaches for her phone, 
and grasping the device she orientates it to her face. A movement of the fin-
gers on the phone’s side-button switches the screen ‘off’ as she gets out of bed. 
In the bathroom there are a series of gestures we do not see: Kayla navigating 
to the correct browser window to play a YouTube video. Yet, what the audi-
ence sees is a brief montage of Kayla using a blending sponge, eyeliner, and 
drying her hair: all individual movements collected beneath the gesture of 
looking into the mirror. We see her carrying her devices back into the room 
(where she nonchalantly throws the laptop and phone onto her bed). As she 
lies in bed, she extends her phone before her face and proceeds to take selfies 
where two poses apparently occur simultaneously: the pose before the mirror 
and the pose before the camera. 
A plethora of movements are exhibited here: reaching, touching, tapping, 
walking, looking, throwing, pressing, grasping, et al. To note, all these move-
ments are executed between Kayla’s body and various screens – the screenic 
topology – in a continuum. Therefore, they are, on the one hand, discrete or 
particular gestures that are isolated in relation to their individual screens; on 
the other hand they are gestures which are coincident and adjacent to one 
another as they emerge in an effect of this screenic topology. What results is 
a constellation of bodily movements: a unified gesturality comprised of 
unique gestural moments. What this means is that the gestures become an 
intermedial that directly affect the ‘shape’ of the screen-sphere (as she carries, 
throws, orientates, and moves screens) and thus her body becomes embodied 
(and not just present) within this shape. 
Such an argument can be made with an understanding of the body that is 
informed by the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Throughout 
his oeuvre, Merleau-Ponty establishes that the body is the thing with which 
an individual experiences the world[40] as he investigates how the body is 
never only an object, but a perceiving thing. He is ardently anti-dualistic, re-
jecting any separation of mind and body, and forwards that the body is an 
‘incarnate consciousness’.[41] Therefore, consciousness and the ‘world’ for 
Merleau-Ponty are mutually dependable parts of a whole; and at the centre 
– the zero point – of this whole is the sensuous, perceiving subject. This con-
ceptualisation of the body runs throughout Merleau-Ponty’s entire literature 
and even emerges in his unfinished final work The Visible and the Invisible 
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(1964), where he writes that the ‘body interposed is not itself a thing … but a 
sensible for itself … [and it] unites us directly with the things through its own 
ontogenesis’.[42] As David Carr writes, this sensuous perception is found ‘in 
the look, the reach, the walk, the mutual corroboration of the sense … [and] 
through the gesture, the body becomes expression, the bearer of meaning in 
the world’.[43] 
What is important to note in Merleau-Ponty’s claims surrounding the 
body is that (as Elizabeth Grosz reminds us) the body ‘is the very condition 
of our access to and conception of space’.[44] Writing in The Phenomenology of 
Perception, Merleau-Ponty refuses to make a distinction between ‘bodily 
space and external space’.[45] As he writes: 
By considering movement, we can see better how [the body] inhabits space (and, 
moreover, time) because movement is not limited to submitting passively to space 
and time, it actively assumes them, it takes them up as basic significance which is 
obscured in the commonplaceness of established situations.[46] 
As Grosz elaborates, for Merleau-Ponty, if ‘consciousness is not spatially 
located and if external objects are always located in space, how is it possible 
for consciousness to establish a space or distance between itself and its ob-
jects?’.[47] What this reveals about Kayla’s movements of her body in relation 
to the screen is that this active assuming of space actively assumes itself 
within the screen-sphere’s topology. 
The film shows how corporeally embodied such an experience of the 
screen-sphere is. Kayla throws her phone across the room and it results in the 
screen shattering. The mosaic of cracks on the screen (itself an interesting 
metaphor for how a screen both hides and reveals) certainly obscures her 
ability to see what is being displayed on the information surface. Yet, use of 
the screen continues, as sight is merely one facet of a multi-faceted mode of 
perceiving the device. Later in the film when she is scrolling – one of the 
most ubiquitous gestures of phone use – she pricks her thumb, and the spot 
of blood becomes a very real indicator of how corporeal and multifaceted 
screenic perception is. 
Cooley examines this multi-faceted mode of perceiving and concludes 
that the mobile device requires an (ostensibly embodied) ‘tactile vision, to be 
understood as a material and dynamic seeing involving eyes as well as 
hands’.[48] In other words, Kayla sees with her hands as much as she does 
with her eyes when engaged with screenic surfaces. But it is not only seeing 
that occurs with the hands, but a complex and specific method of knowing. 
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This prehensile knowing is something linguist Jürgen Streeck explores in his 
book Gesturecraft: The Manu-facture of Meaning (2009), where knowledge of 
the world is developed through grasping. To grasp is not simply to hold, but 
rather it is a complex prehensile posture that is made manifest between the 
relationship of the palm, pads, and fingers of the hand. As Streeck describes 
it, grasping is a ‘constellation of two or three virtual fingers: every [prehensile] 
posture is a configuration of two or three force vectors … acting as a single 
unit’.[49] As he writes: 
Grasping exemplifies what is meant by ‘embodied knowledge’: underlying our rou-
tine abilities to grasp, hold, reorient, and transport objects is a wealth of knowledge 
not only about objects and the prehensile postures that suit them but also of the 
mechanics of tasks in which objects are handled … Grasping is a sophisticated, know-
ledge-based activity.[50] 
The virtual fingers in comprehension are not only force-vectors upon 
which an object rests, but rather they are agents of active touch as well. To 
have something grasped in the hand we commit to an intentional act of in-
carnate consciousness and the held object becomes an extension of our 
body’s Merleau-Pontian perceptual horizon. Ultimately, simply by grasping 
her phone, Kayla’s place in the topology becomes an embodied one insofar 
as she is not only holding her phone, but comprehending. In a very real way, 
any distinction between her body, her consciousness, and the screens can no 
longer be understood in terms of objects that are internal or external, inside 
or outside of one another. There is no distinction. Her experience of the 
screen-sphere becomes both spatially situated and perceptive – undoubtedly, 
an embodied one. 
Fig. 2: The film presents an image of tactile vision that erases any distinction between 
Kayla’s eyes, her screen, and her grasping hand. 
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While these movements begin embodying Kayla within her screens, the 
mirror and its ability to allow her to see herself within this proximity further 
reinforces this embodiment, completing the gestural movements of the selfie 
until that moment when the image is arrested. This can be evidenced by turn-
ing to the mirror, and how the mirror’s spatial capabilities complicate an in-
dividual’s relationship with their device. 
The mirror and reconciling the body 
There are two mirrors Kayla engages with in the opening sequence of the 
film. The first is the one in the bathroom in which she prepares herself by 
applying make-up. The second is the digital mirror created by the mobile 
device.[51] 
Fig. 3: An example of the digital mirror capability of the contemporary mobile phone 
form factor. 
The mirror – whether analogue or digital – has always been a site of ‘sep-
arateness’, alterity, and oddness, and this results in a pervasive and unavoid-
able ‘troubling strangeness’[52] often experienced when looking into a mir-
ror. This is not only due to the apparent distance between the individual and 
their reflection, but also because of its inevitable chirality. It is an odd mo-
ment, and in response to this moment, there have been a variety of accounts 
and theories as to what happens when we encounter our reflection. In both 
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psychoanalysis and phenomenology, however, there is seemingly an agree-
ment that the person or subject before the mirror and the other reflected 
back go through a process of identification, reconciliation, or resolution.[53] 
As Nick Crossely writes the mirror as a technology requires that an individual 
develops a ‘habitual familiarity’ with their own image through being able to 
distinguish the specular image as ‘“mere reflection” of self rather than a real 
other’.[54] In psychoanalysis, it is Jacques Lacan’s authoritative work on the 
‘mirror-stage’ that explores how the ego is formed through an identification 
with its specular image. The ego manifests in the ‘subject when [they] assume 
an image’[55] and with this ‘the infant form[s] a false identification with its 
specular self as it re-organizes [sic] the latter merely as a sign of oneself’.[56] 
For phenomenologists, within the mirror a displacement emerges between 
the body as object and the body as perceiving subject: the Leib and the Körper 
respectively. Before the mirror stands the Leib (living body) that ‘in the phe-
nomenological context, is the experienced body or body-as-lived’,[57] while 
beyond the mirror’s tain exists the Körper (the body as physical object)[58] 
creating a displacement between the body and the subject. However, Merleau-
Ponty reminds us that a reconciliation takes place, and the mirror re-estab-
lishes the body exclusively as subjectively centred as we ‘try to fill this void 
by recourse to the image in the mirror’.[59] 
However, such displacement, on the face of it, is amplified by the digital 
mirror insofar as the ‘mirror’ of Kayla’s mobile phone does not reflect her at 
all. Rather, it records and displays an image that functions in a manner like a 
mirrored surface. Further, the camera and screen which allow for this func-
tionality are adjacent to one another, and this results in a fundamental dif-
ference between the digital mirror and the analogue mirror: a break in eye-
contact. Eye-contact becomes impossible in the phone’s ‘mirror’ and what 
this results in is a ‘reflection’ that is looking slightly away. Kayla is looking at 
herself looking at herself, and arguably seeing herself as others see her.[60] 
Therefore, resolving this displacement between the Leib and Körper, sub-
ject and object, sign and self, becomes problematised in the functionality of 
this mirror and the habitual familiarity of the mirror becomes strangely un-
familiar insofar as there appear to be two ‘modes’ of perception happening 
simultaneously here: Kayla is seeing herself reflected in the phone’s mirror 
while simultaneously seeing herself as an irresolvable other, and the mirror-
alterity reconciled by the analogue glass mirror is ostensibly left open in the 
camera-screen digital mirror apparatus. Therefore, Kayla – as with other 
selfie-takers – is being both reflected and not reflected and this results in a 
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‘jolt’[61] or a break in the mirror’s inevitable attempt at reconciliation be-
tween the subject and their reflection. Put another way, the break in eye-con-
tact that makes it impossible for the subject and their reflection to fully rec-
oncile causes two supposedly discontinuous orders of perception to occur 
simultaneously. These two discontinuous orders of perception are referred 
to by Massumi as mirror-vision and movement-vision. Mirror-vision and its 
propensity for resolution is what happens when an individual sees them-
selves along the ‘single-axis of vision [that] stretches you between two sur-
faces recapitulating the same’.[62] Movement-vision occurs when you see a 
recorded image of yourself played back. The moment when Kayla looks into 
her digital mirror both of these orders of perception occur simultaneously, 
and while the mirror-vision desperately tries to resolve the image of herself 
the recorded movement-vision resists such resolution. 
How then is such a fissure resolved? The mirror’s habitual identification 
or resolution cannot be resolved optically as one would expect in the ana-
logue, specular mirror, and therefore the difficulty of the eyes in this mo-
ment to meet themselves is supplemented by the knowing, grasping hand. 
Eye-contact becomes supplanted by ‘hand-contact’ (grasping) and therefore 
the digital space of the digital mirror becomes embodied through the tactile, 
knowing virtual fingers. In other words, while this looking into the mirror 
does produce a displacement between Kayla and her (non)reflection, it is the 
grasping of the hand that unifies this displacement between these two dis-
continuous orders of perception through gesture. Ultimately, this allows Kayla 
to gesturally ‘think’ herself into the body’s displacement: no longer outside 
or inside the screen-sphere’s arrangement of surfaces, but embodied within 
its topology. 
Conclusion 
While Eighth Grade effectively demonstrates how screens have permeated 
and enveloped the lifeworld of Kayla, it never collapses into a message of 
moral panic or nomophobia. There is a moment later in the film where Kayla 
reaches her point of apotheosis where she ritualistically burns a box of mem-
ories in an attempt to overcome her insecurities and move forward. There is 
no screen between her and the fire, no mediator, and she has turned away 
from the shadows of the cave-wall to look at what it is that projects them. Yet, 
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for the final shot of the film we see Kayla moving into the sphere again, open-
ing software on her laptop and literally talking with her reflection in the dig-
ital mirror, using the space as a moment of affirmation. Burnham under-
stands that, today, the screen is not something to be ‘escaped’, instead it is 
something we need to consider more readily. The selfie, for Kayla, is one of 
the many ways of doing so. 
From Kayla’s action, through a Merleau-Pontian reading of the body, 
Sobchack’s comments that an individual cannot ‘physically dwell in this new 
spatiality without special technologies (such as sophisticated “virtual reality” 
equipment)’[63] becomes a dubious one. The embodied process of grasping 
the device and recognising the displacement offered by the digital mirror 
results in a collection of movements – or rather gestures – that embody her 
in a very real way. As Grosz contends, the digital space’s ability to disembody 
is a ‘pervasive fantasy … linked to the fantasy of mastery at a distance, of “tele-
presence,” the illusion of being able to leave the body at will and appear else-
where’.[64] In a cutting rejoinder, Grosz simply queries ‘how it is possible to 
escape the body and the real is unclear … even or especially as one dons one’s 
virtual reality gloves and goggles or lights up the necessary cigarette and pre-
pares coffee to begin a heavy session on the computer’.[65] To take this a step 
further, how can one physically distance themselves from the screenic topol-
ogy of the screen-sphere, if one of the principle methods of engaging with it 
is to grasp it and look into its digital mirror? 
To reiterate, specifically regarding the gesture of the selfie, it is this hold-
ing and looking which are combined into the knowing, active touch of tactile 
vision that embody the user in the screenic topology of the screen-sphere. I 
agree entirely with Sobchack in that our contemporary definition of the 
screen needs to be reformulated. However, by examining the behaviours of 
Kayla, and the embodied way screens are used, it is perhaps important to re-
formulate our definition of screenic gestures as well. The selfie is a fascinat-
ing example of a gesture unique to today’s screenic topology, but it is not the 
only one that should be read as embodied within this constellation. It is not 
reactive to the screen, but a gesture that exists in an effect of it. 
However, I do concede that I have only examined one ‘dimension’ of 
these gestures: the movement component of the totality of the symbolic 
movement. This is partly a result of looking exclusively at movement and 
space. Future research into this topic will need to perhaps concern itself more 
with the symbolic and time. Further, the selfie as a ‘complete’ gesture needs 
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to account for the arrest of the image, the editing of the photograph, and the 
inevitable online dissemination colloquially referred to as ‘sharing’. 
Yet, such concessions aside, this article has evidenced that the selfie can-
not simply be reduced to a 2D image and rather it should be conceptualised 
as a complex, embodying screenic gesture. This gesture complicates and ex-
tends existing definitions of how we engage with our screens in the effect of 
an expanding, multiplying ubiquitous screenic topology. 
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Notes 
[1] Lifeworld is a central concept of phenomenology defined as ‘a novel subject domain with its own 
structure and governing principles: the realm of consciousness or subjectivity and its world of 
experience’ (Luft & Øvergaard 2013, p. 2) 
[2] Sobchack 2016, p. 157. 
[3] Ibid., p. 158. 
[4] A brief note on the distinction between ‘screen’ and ‘screenic’. The term ‘screen’ refers to the 
formal, ontic screen-objects. The word screenic accounts not only for the formal screen-object, 
VOL 8 (2), 2019 280 
SELFIE-SCREEN-SPHERE 
but also the more general phenomena that occur in relation to or as an effect of screens (i.e. 
screenic touching, screenic space, et al.). See Chateau & Moure 2016, pp. 15-16. 
[5] Oxford Dictionaries 2013. 
[6] Tifentale 2018, pp. 26-45. 
[7] Hess 2015, p. 1632. 
[8] See Eckel et al. 2018. 
[9] Senft & Baym 2015, p. 158. 
[10] Frosh 2015, p. 1624. 
[11] Strauven 2012, p. 71. 
[12] Strauven 2016, p 144. 
[13] Verhoef 2012, p. 24. 
[14] Cooley 2004, p. 137. 
[15] Streeck 2009, p. 49. ‘Virtual fingers’ refer to a complex relationship between the facets of the 
hand (palm, pads, fingers, and thumb) and the forces they create on an object. A virtual finger 
creates an oppositional space that allows for grasping. The details of the specific motor mechanics 
of the hand are beyond the scope of this study. 
[16] Cooley 2004, p. 137. 
[17] Best exemplified in the writings of Jill Walker-Retteberg (2014), Kate Warfield (2017), and Katrin 
Tiidenberg & Edgar Gómez Cruz (2015). 
[18] In Edmund Husserl’s book Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Phi-
losophy – Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution (commonly referred to as Ideas II) 
he draws a distinction between the Leib and the Körper. While this distinction does not have a 
direct English translation, it is often written as the ‘Body’ (Leib) and the ‘body’ (Körper), with the 
capital B illustrating the Leib as the lived, perceiving thing. I will not be using a capital ‘B’ to dis-
tinguish between the two, as ultimately through Merleau-Ponty’s work such a definition is im-
possible. 
[19] Crossley 2004, p. 96. 
[20] Sobchack 2016, p. 157. 
[21] Flusser 2016, p. 4. 
[22] Olenina & Schulzki 2017, p. 2. 
[23] Sobchack 2016, p. 158. 
[24] The role of light in the cinema apparatus is a complicated one and perhaps best exemplified in 
Anthony McCall’s Line Describing a Cone, where a point of light draws a cone between a projector 
and a screen. In McCall’s own words the installation ‘is dealing with the projected light beam itself, 
rather than treating the light beam as a mere carrier of coded information, which is decoded 
when it strikes a flat surface (the screen)’ (Walley 2004, pp. 65-75). The light itself plays an im-
portant role in describing the apparatus. Su Ballard (2007, pp. 34-42) reminds us that what 
McCall’s work illustrates is the material space of cinema. Eighth Grade director Bo Burnham 
acknowledges in an interview that ‘screens are a beautiful light source’ (Buder 2019) and uses this 
light to connect a user to their screen, as the film features several shots of a figure in a dark room 
connected to the device by the light emitting off it. All the screens used in the film were practical, 
and connected to the internet, as the director was concerned with how the light of the screen – 
and the material space created by it – changes through the gesture of scrolling. 
[25] Foucault 1967, p. 24. 
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[26] Friedburg 2006, p 229. Anna Friedberg tracks the metaphor of the window and its relationship 
to the screen. The multiscreen functionality of the current screen has a considerable impact on 
an individual’s experience of the screen-sphere. As Friedburg writes, like the MacOS, the ‘inter-
face’ of Windows extends screen space by overlapping screens of various sizes; each ‘window’ can 
run a different application; the user can scroll through a text within a window, arrange windows 
on the screen in stacked or overlapping formations, decorate windows (with wallpapers, textured 
patterns), and conduct new forms of ‘window shopping’ (p 229). 
[27] De Rosa & Strauven forthcoming in 2020, p. 4. 
[28] Ibid. p. 4. 
[29] Hanich 2017. 
[30] Sobchack 2016, p. 157. 
[31] Ibid., p. 163. 
[32] Ibid., pp. 171-172. 
[33] Massumi 1999, p. 306. 
[34] Ibid., p. 306. 
[35] Sobchack 2016, p. 172. 
[36] Massumi 2002, p. 185. 
[37] Ibid., p. 184. 
[38] Huhtamo 2004, p. 33. 
[39] De Rosa & Strauven forthcoming in 2020, p. 4. 
[40] Merleau-Ponty 1958. 
[41] Carr 1967, p. 369. 
[42] Merleau-Ponty 1964, pp. 135-136. 
[43] Ibid., pp. 395-396. 
[44] Grosz 1994, p. 91. 
[45] Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 117. 
[46] Ibid., p. 117. 
[47] Grosz 1994, p. 91. 
[48] Cooley 2004, p. 137. 
[49] Streeck 2009, p. 49. 
[50] Ibid., p. 51. 
[51] It is worth mentioning that mobile phones can create specular reflections as well (see Fig. 2). 
However, such reflections are less implicit within the selfie process. 
[52] It is beyond the scope of this article to fully explore the complex and storied history of the mirror. 
For a primer on this Sabine Melchoir-Bonnet’s The Mirror: A History is essential, in particular the 
extended section on the mirror’s ‘troubling strangeness’. 
[53] It is worth acknowledging the existence of the ongoing debate around the mirror’s reconciliation 
and identification in relation to feminist theory. Luce Irigaray’s work and criticism of Lacan is 
possibly the progenitor of this debate (see both 1985a and 1985b, or Huffer 2002). 
[54] Crossley 2004, pp. 96-97. 
VOL 8 (2), 2019 282 
SELFIE-SCREEN-SPHERE 
[55] Lacan 1977, p. 503. 
[56] Sobchack 1992, p. 106. 
[57] Cerbone 2006, p. 101. 
[58] Carmen 1999, p. 209. 
[59] Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 105. 
[60] Such othering is emphasised further when the image is captured during the selfie gesture, as the 
front-facing camera of the mobile phone flips the image once it is captured, as if the image was 
taken by another behind the camera. 
[61] Massumi 2002, p. 47. 
[62] Ibid., p. 48. 
[63] Sobchack 2016, p. 158. 
[64] Grosz 2001, p. 83. 
[65] Ibid., p. 85. 
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